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"SECULAR HUMANISM" AND THE
DEFINITION OF RELIGION: EXTENDING A
MODIFIED "ULTIMATE CONCERN" TEST
TO Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools
AND Smith v. Board of School Commissioners
The Supreme Court may no longer postpone defining "religion"
under the Constitution.' Growing ideological variety in America is
creating first amendment establishment clause claims against state aid
to left-wing and right-wing ideologies. The Court must bridge tie
widening chasm between the expansive definition of religion under the
free exercise clause2 and the narrow and unclear establishment clause
approach to ideologies.3
Two recent "secular humanism" cases illustrate this problem.' In
these suits against public schools, the definition of religion was an
issue under the establishment clause, as well as under the free exercise
clause.' The plaintiff parents claimed: First, that teaching "secular
humanism" to their children impermissibly burdens their free exercise
rights;6 and second, that teaching "secular humanism" amounts to
state action establishing a religion.7 The courts settled each case under
one theory. Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools was decided
1. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2591-2607 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(expressing a willingness to consider whether "secular humanism" was a religion being
unconstitutionally established in the public schools).
2. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 1046 (1987).
3. See Edwards, 107 S. Ct. 2573.
4. Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939 (S.D. Ala.), ret"d 827 F.2d 684 (11th
Cir. 1987); Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools, 647 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. Tenn. 1986),
rev'd sub nom. Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 56 U.S.L.W. 3569 (1988).
5. Plaintiffs asserted that schools denigrate traditional religion, sex roles, and values, while
preaching a religion of worldly progress, evolution, internationalism, and atheism, among other
beliefs. These largely fundamentalist attacks on state education find support in legal
commentary. See, eg., Whitehead & Conlan, The Establishment of Secular Humanism and Its
First Amendment Implications, 10 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1 (1978); Comment, Secularism in the
Law: The Religion of Secular Humanism, 8 OrIo N.U.L. REV. 329 (1981).
6. Smith, 655 F. Supp. at 946; Mozert, 647 F. Supp. at 1195.
7. Smith, 655 F. Supp. at 946; Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools, 579 F. Supp. 1051,
1052, 1053 (E.D. Tenn. 1984), rev'd, 765 F.2d 75 (6th Cir. 1985). At a hearing on a motion to
dismiss, in Mozert, Judge Hull declared that "mere exposure" to disagreeable ideas did not create
a free exercise burden, and he also wrote that plaintiffs had a cause of action if the schools taught
that any particular religion was true, or that some particular means to salvation must be followed
by everyone. 579 F. Supp. at 1052-53. The indoctrination of a means to, and need for,
"salvation" is also an establishment clause claim.
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under free exercise law.8 Smith v. Board of School Commissioners was
decided under establishment clause law.9 In both cases, the district
courts found something behind the phrase "secular humanism" which
violated the first amendment.'o
To address these issues, this Comment defends an expansive defini-
tion of religion which is uniform under the establishment clause and
under the free exercise clause. This Comment, to effect this expan-
sion, constructs empirical indicators of religion for use in establish-
ment clause cases. This proposed approach distinguishes science from
values and philosophies, and only the latter two might be called "secu-
lar humanism." This distinction incorporates longstanding Supreme
Court jurisprudence allowing the teaching of evolution." Expanding
religious protection under the free exercise clause made a balancing
approach necessary.'" Similarly, using an expansive definition of reli-
gion to broaden the scope of the establishment clause will require
more extensive balancing of state interests against disestablishment
values. ' 3
8. Mozert, 579 F. Supp. 1053 (E.D. Tenn. 1984), dismissed, 582 F. Supp. 201 (E.D. Tenn.
1984), rev'd, 765 F.2d 75, 78 (6th Cir. 1985) (Sixth Circuit remanded for trial on merits, directing
consideration of free exercise burden and compelling state interests), later proceeding, 647 F.
Supp. 1194 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (finding for plaintiffs under free exercise rules), rev'd sub noma.
Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ. 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987) (dismissal under free
exercise law; no "burden" existed).
9. Smith, 655 F. Supp. at 974-88 (establishment clause analysis, with free exercise burdens
stated to be incidental to the establishment of "secular humanism"), rev'd, Smith v. Board of
School Comm'rs, 827 F.2d 684 (11 th Cir. 1987) (reversing trial court under establishment clause
law).
10. Smith, 655 F. Supp. at 988; Mozert, 647 F. Supp. at 1200, 1203.
11. In Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987), the Court put to rest the legislative
attacks upon the teaching of evolution. In Edwards the Court struck down a statute which
required equal time for "creation science." See also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968)
(anti-evolution statute struck down); Crowley v. Smithsonian Inst., 636 F.2d 738 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (evolution exhibits do not establish secular humanism); McClean v. Arkansas Bd. of
Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982) ("creation science" law, similar to that in Edwards,
struck down), aff'd, 723 F.2d 45 (8th Cir. 1983). But see Gelfand, Of Monkeys and Men-An
Atheist's Heretical View of the Constitutionality of Teaching the Disproof of a Religion, 16 J. L. &
EDUC. 271 (1987).
12. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).
13. For the establishment clause balancing test, see Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 249
(1982).
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I. THE EXPANSIVE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE AND THE
UNKNOWN SCOPE OF THE ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE
A. The Current Law
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... "I' This statement
comprises the establishment clause and the free exercise clause of the
United States Constitution. The exact scope of each clause is uncer-
tain. However, the constitutional rules within each clause are rela-
tively settled.
1. Establishment Clause Law: Agreeing To Disagree
The Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman 15 set forth a three-pronged test
for determining establishment clause violations: First, does the state
action have a predominantly religious purpose; second, does it have the
(primary) effect of establishing or inhibiting religion; or third, does it
entangle religion and the state?1" Failure on any one prong invalidates
the state action. 17
A balancing test articulated in Larson v. Valente complements the
Lemon test. Valente applies to governmental actions that would
otherwise be impermissible establishments of religion.18 The case
holds that a state action impinging upon establishment clause values is
allowable if it serves a compelling state interest and employs means
"closely fitted" to that state interest.19
The Supreme Court rarely needs to define "religion" in deciding
establishment clause cases, because the parties generally agree that the
issue is "religious." 2 When, as in Smith, plaintiffs wish to prove that
a religion does exist, despite its practitioners' claims to the contrary,
the courts cannot escape the need to define religion. The issue changes
14. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
15. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
16. Id. at 612-13. The Court confirmed the vigor of the Lemon test in Edwards v. Aguillard,
107 S. Ct. 2573, 2577 (1987).
17. Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2577.
18. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 245-49 (1982).
19. Id.
20. For example, in the establishment clause cases regarding state funding of parochial
schools, both parties agreed that parochial schools are "religious." See, eg., Board of Educ. v.
Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); see also Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S.
481 (1986) (state funding of seminary training); Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373
(1985) (state funding teachers in parochial schools); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980)
(posting the Ten Commandments in a classroom); Abington School Dist. v. Schemp, 374 U.S.
203 (1963) (Bible in school at issue).
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from "given religion, what is establishment?" to "given rules of estab-
lishment, what is religion?"
2. Free Exercise Law: Sincerity as Religion
The current law consists of the four-part test articulated in Thomas
v. Review Board."' First, is a religious belief sincere? This sincerity
prong of the Thomas test does not mean to test the ultimate truth of
religious statements.2 Second, is that belief burdened by the state
action at issue? 3 Third, what compelling state interests exist to justify
that burden? Finally, in balancing compelling state interests against
the free exercise right, has the state used the least burdensome means
to achieve those state interests? 24
In free exercise cases, the definition of "religion" is more often an
issue. The problem of definition arises when a holder of nontradi-
tional views seeks constitutional protection against state actions, and
the state pleads that no religious issue exists. The Court has recog-
nized that a traditional definition of religion would risk implicitly
establishing those beliefs because of discriminatory free exercise pro-
tections.26  The Court has therefore only provided a definition when
forced to construe a statute.
21. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (state could not deny unemployment benefits
to claimant whose religious beliefs forbade working to produce armaments; this "indirect
coercion" impermissibly burdened plaintiff's free exercise of religion). Thomas was reaffirmed
on similar facts in Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 1046 (1987). See also
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (state could not deny unemployment benefits to
Sabbatarian who refused to work on Saturday).
22. The Court, since United States v. Ballard, 329 U.S. 187 (1944), has not wished to enquire
into the "truth" of religious claims. Sincerity, not truth, nor even doctrinal coherence, was the
test in Thomas:
Courts should not undertake to dissect religious beliefs because the believer admits that he is
"struggling" with his position or because his beliefs are not articulated with the clarity and
precision that a more sophisticated person might employ .... [A]nd the guarantee of free
exercise is not limited to beliefs which are shared by all members of a religious sect ....
Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation.
Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715-16; see also Hobbie, 107 S. Ct. at 1051 n.9 (explicitly reaffirmed
Ballard).
23. Conditioning receipt of "an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious
faith" creates an "indirect coercion" which satisfies the coercion requirement. Thomas, 450 U.S.
at 717.
24. Id. at 717-19.
25. E.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163
(1965). In Thomas, a referee accepted Thomas' moral objections as religious, as did the Review
Board and the courts. 450 U.S. at 714.
26. "There is even a danger of unintended discrimination-a danger that a claim's chances of
success would be greater the more familiar or salient the claim's connection with conventional
religiosity could be made to appear." Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 457 (1971); see also
Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69-70 (1953) ("it is no business of courts to say that what is
448
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3. United States v. Seeger: Free Exercise Origins of the "Ultimate
Concern" Test
In United States v. Seeger, the Supreme Court sought to avoid reli-
gious favoritism in defining religion under a statute. To protect non-
traditional beliefs, the Court expanded the definition of religion to
include a person's "ultimate concern."27 The "ultimate concern" test
raised conscientious objection, under a statutory exemption to the mil-
itary draft, to the status of religion. In so ruling, the Court reasoned
that the objector's "ultimate" beliefs held a position "parallel" to that
which traditional religion has for mainstream believers.28
An influential Harvard Law Review Note, published in 1978,
defended the "ultimate concern" definition of Seeger, but only under
the free exercise clause.29  The Note advocated Lawrence Tribe's
bifurcated definition of religion, with an expansive definition in free
exercise cases, and with a narrow definition of religion for establish-
ment clause cases. 30  The narrow establishment clause definition was
recommended to prevent wholesale invalidation of legislative
actions.3'
a religious practice or activity for one group is not religion under the protection of the First
Amendment"); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 85-88 (1944) (freedom of religion includes
the right to ideas "which are rank heresy to followers of orthodox faiths .... The Fathers of the
Constitution . .. fashioned a charter of government which envisaged the widest possible
toleration of conflicting views.").
27. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 187 (quoting P. TILLICH, THE SHAKING OF THE
FOUNDATION (1948)). Arguably, the statutory construction of Seeger, restricted by
congressional action under military law to only pacifist beliefs, is narrower than the sincerity
standard under free exercise rules.
28. The Court reaffirmed this approach in Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. at 340. Justice
Harlan concurred in the judgment only for reasons of administrative necessity, but believed that
the statute providing for "religious" conscientious objection should have been struck down for
discriminating against nonreligious conscience. Id. at 356-57. Justice Harlan wrote:
[Congress cannot act] without equal regard for men of nonreligious conscience. It goes
without saying that the First Amendment is perforce a guarantee that the conscience of
religion may not be preferred simply because organized religious groups in general are more
visible than the individual who practices morals and ethics on his own. Any view of the
Free Exercise Clause that does not insist on this neutrality would engulf the Establishment
Clause and render it vestigial.
Id. at 361 n.12.
29. Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056 (1978).
30. Id. at 1085. Under the free exercise clause, anything "arguably religious" would be
protected. Under the establishment clause, the state could do anything "arguably not religious."
Id. at 1085 n.138 (citing L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 828-29 (1st ed. 1978)).
Greenawalt noted that intermediate groups, arguably religious-arguably nonreligious, would
receive free exercise benefits without bearing establishment restraints. Greenawalt, Religion as a
Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 753, 814 (1984).
31. Note, supra note 29, at 1084; see also Merel, The Protection of Individual Choice: A
Consistent Understanding of Religion Under the First Amendment, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 805, 821
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B. Alternatives to Seeger: The Analogical Methods
Defining religion by analogy to traditional religions is the only
method explicitly adopted by a lower court.32 Other alternatives to
the Seeger approach generally are variations upon the analogical
method. The two greatest flaws of this method are that it implicitly
prefers currently dominant religious forms, and it narrows judicial
awareness of the great variety of religions.
1. Explicitly Defining Religion by Analogy to Recent
and Dominant Religions
The most influential decisions explicitly developing the analogical
method arose from two Third Circuit cases in which the definition of
religion was directly at issue. The method was first introduced by
Judge Adams in Malnak v. Yogi, which upheld the finding that Tran-
scendental Meditation was a religion whose teaching in the public
schools violated the establishment clause.3 3 In Africa v. Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania, Judge Adams applied this definition in an
opinion which unanimously rejected a claim that a "back to basics"
community, MOVE, was a religion under the first amendment.3 4
Judge Adams stated three criteria for the decision:
First, a religion addresses fundamental and ultimate questions having
to do with deep and imponderable matters. Second, a religion is com-
prehensive in nature, and it consists of a belief-system as opposed to an
isolated teaching. Third, a religion often can be recognized by the pres-
ence of certain formal and external signs [such as, hierarchy, ritual, and
ceremony].35
Judge Adams named his doctrinal creation "definition by anal-
ogy."3 6 In applying the analogical approach, Judge Adams found that
MOVE's doctrines were not fundamental because they were not "suffi-
ciently analogous to more 'traditional' theologies.",37 Based on this
finding he had little trouble stating that MOVE's doctrines were not
(1978) ("any law may offend the religious sensibilities of some one individual"). Merel has
actually posed a free exercise, not an establishment, problem, because an "offense" to a religion is
a "burden."
32. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 200, 207 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 207-15.
34. 662 F.2d 1025, 1032 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 908 (1982). MOVE's doctrines
included a rejection of ritual and hierarchy, a belief in the unity of all life and a desire to return to
"original" simplicity of life, including the special prison dietary requirements at issue for MOVE
leader Frank Africa.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1033-36.
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"comprehensive." 38 Finally, because some of MOVE's tenets were
congregational and anarchic, Judge Adams found no hierarchy or
ceremony.39
Judge Adams' formulation illustrates the problems inherent in an
analogical method of definition. This approach explicitly prefers
"traditional" religions, to the exclusion of less conventional beliefs.4°
Additionally, Judge Adams' method grants preference to religions
which have incubated in a leisured elite long enough to become "com-
prehensive" in a systematic sense; in contrast to the less intellectually
systematized passions of MOVE, and of lower classes everywhere."
Finally, the analogical method's views of "fundamental" and "ulti-
mate" questions are severely ethnocentric, as evidenced by the failure
to recognize MOVE's beliefs as a variant upon common forms of
pantheism.42
Nonetheless, many commentators prefer the analogical method.43
Although Professor Kent Greenawalt offers his own formulation of
the analogical method, he praises Judge Adams' opinions.' Greena-
walt believes that courts have been implicitly using the analogical
approach, and that religion must continue to be defined in terms of the
"indisputably religious."45 Greenawalt establishes recent dominant
Christian experience as the "family" of relevant characteristics which
38. Id. at 1035.
39. Id. at 1035-36.
40. Judge Adams simply missed a huge portion of Christianity with his excessively
conventional concepts. This approach excludes even the anarchic traditions of Christianity
which eschewed ceremony and hierarchy. See, e.g., Anabaptism, in I THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
RELIGION AND ETHICS, 406-12 (1922). Historian Christopher Hill writes of the pantheistic
doctrine of one radical protestant: "But if God is everywhere, if matter is God, then there can be
no difference between the sacred and the secular: pantheism leads to secularism." C. HILL, THE
WORLD TURNED UPSIDE DOWN 150 (1978).
41. M. WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 399-640 (1978). The lower classes tend to have
"magical" religions: unsystematic religions and gods from which they can receive worldly
benefits. In contrast, leisured intellectuals in privileged social strata consider "meaning," not
physical discomfort, to be problematic in life. Therefore, it is leisured intellectuals who construct
the great systems of religious thought. Lower classes seek "compensation" for their pain, while
upper classes seek "legitimation" of their position. Id. at 490-92.
42. Especially disadvantaged are populist forms of religion. No intellectual caste materially
benefits from keeping alive these ideas, and thus they are lost to the general culture.
43. See, eg., Freeman, The Misguided Search for a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 71
GEO. L.J. 1519 (1983); Greenawalt, supra note 30.
44. "[O]nly in Judge Adams' opinions does the analogical approach rise to articulate self-
consciousness." Greenawalt, supra note 30, at 774.
45. Id. at 790. But see United States v. Gillette, 401 U.S. 437, 457, 461 n.23 (1971) (Court
hopes to avoid favoring "familiar" religions).
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define "religion.",4 6 To come within this definition of religion, other
religions must resemble this orthodoxy.4 7
Further applying his analogical method, Greenawalt rejects the
social scientific idea that an ideology, such as Marxism, is a religion:
"Marxism presents a comprehensive view covering the deepest ques-
tions of human existence that is not usually considered religious. ' '48
This methodological position should be rejected as too narrow and as
contrary to fact.49 Greenawalt's approach would fail to protect Ameri-
can society from the establishment of modern ideologies, while also
failing to protect the free exercise even of older forms of Christianity.
2. Implicit Use of the Analogical Method: "'Religion" and
"Irreligion" as "Conscience"
Other approaches to defining religion change the vocabulary, and
even add atheism to the definition. For example, Gail Merel declares
the "fundamental principle of both religion clauses [to be] maximizing
the scope for expression of individual choice, permitting state interfer-
ence ... only when essential for the accomplishment of a substantial
state purpose."5 To this end, Merel defines "religion" as traditional
religion, and she uses "irreligion" to describe atheism and agnosticism.
The residual category is "nonreligion," which she deems synonymous
with "secular."'" Only "religion" and "irreligion" receive first amend-
ment protection.52
46. Greenawalt uses Wittgenstein's idea of a word referring to a "family" of characteristics.
For example, "game" is used to describe many very different activities which share some, but not
all, characteristics. Greenawalt, supra note 30, at 768.
47. One could only justify this bias on power grounds: e.g., dominant religious organizations
are too strong to be subjected to the ideals of the Constitution. Cf Johnson, Concepts and
Compromise in First Amendment Religious Doctrine, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 817, 840 (1984)
(Johnson argues that first amendment doctrine only makes sense as political compromise). It is
beyond the scope of this Comment to argue that "realpolitik" is only a means-ends analysis, and
that Constitutional analysis is a moral-rhetorical, as well as a scientific (realpolitik), undertaking.
48. Greenawalt, supra note 30, at 768.
49. See, e.g., M. KIDRON & R. SEGAL, THE STATE OF THE WORLD ATLAS Map 34 (1981)
(listed religions of Marxism-Leninism include: Moscow denomination, Peking denomination,
Moscow alignment, local variant); see also P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 116-28 (1966) (Marxism as a "symbolic universe").
50. Merel, supra note 31, at 821 (emphasis in original). For similar problems, under a
different vocabulary, see Note, The Sacred and the Profane: A First Amendment Definition of
Religion. 61 TEX. L. REV. 139 (1982).
51. Merel, supra note 31, at 812-15. This approach has been cited approvingly by appellate
courts. See Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 827 F.2d 684, 692 n.9 (I lth Cir. 1987); Grove v.
Mead School Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1536 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985).
52. Merel, supra note 31, at 812-15. For example, a conscientious objector is not advancing
either religion or irreligion, and does not merit first amendment protection, but an atheist's
Vol. 63:445, 1988
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The first problem with Merel's formulation is that it begs the issue
of defining religion. She simply adopts by default a conventional,
traditional definition of religion, to which she adds the opposing scep-
tical doctrines, "irreligion."" This is the equivalent of receiving a
complaint that "2" is not the entirety of extant numbers, and then
responding by expanding the set to include "-2." The opposite of a
conventional idea reflects that conventional idea. Merel's formulation
simply uses a new vocabulary to establish traditional religious ideas in
the legal lexicon.
Second, Merel's formulation intentionally restricts freedom of con-
science. She conflates moral law and state law when she writes: "But
to protect the exercise of conscience in all things would effectively
render every citizen, at his own option, a law unto himself."54 All
forms of religions of conscience, known as antinomian religions, do
render persons moral laws unto themselves." In fact, state laws will
be obeyed by minorities out of respect for the majority process. Los-
ing minorities need not accept state laws as coterminous with "moral
laws."56 Merel sees the antinomian implications of the first amend-
ment, but then retreats into conventional religion and its opposite. 7
Merel's approach discriminatorily benefits traditional beliefs. In
contrast, the Supreme Court has worried about defining "religion" in a
way which implicitly established religion.58  Lower courts and com-
mentators should share the Court's concern.
attempt to advocate "irreligion" in the public schools would violate the establishment clause. Id.
at 814-15.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 812.
55. In United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), the Court wrote that Seeger's beliefs
resembled the Quaker conscience. 380 U.S. at 189. The difference between Seeger's antinomian
conscience and a Quaker's is one of the metaphysical assumption about God guiding the choice.
Either form of antinomianism renders each person a moral "law unto himself." See Miller &
Tucker, What is a Quaker, in RELIGION IN AMERICA 218 (1975) (Quakers as logical outcome of
protestantism, including development of a morality guided by an "inner light"). On the
importance of antinomianism for democracy, see M. WEBER, supra note 41, at 1204-I1.
56. Merel's formulation subverts the first amendment's purpose of providing the greatest
possible separation of state law and the "objectified values" of "moral law." See infra notes
59-100 and accompanying text. Merel's conflation leads to a majoritarian, but still totalitarian,
state, which demands obedience to its "General Will." E.g., Rousseau, The Social Contract, in
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 272-73 (1978).
57. Merel is quite correct to note that atheism is a religion. See II THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
RELIGION AND ETHICS 173-90 (1922) (Article titles on types of atheistic doctrines include:
Christian Atheism; Egyptian Atheism; Greek and Roman Atheism; Ancient Indian Atheism;
Modern Indian Atheism; Jain Atheism; Jewish Atheism; Muslim Atheism).
58. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 457 (1971).
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II. MODIFYING SEEGER: ULTIMATE VALUES, ULTIMATE
MEANINGS, AND ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
IMPLICATIONS
Although the Supreme Court developed the Seeger, "ultimate con-
cern," definition of religion as part of statutory construction, this
Comment advocates the general adoption of a reformulated Seeger for
three major reasons: To protect sincere believers of nontraditional reli-
gions, to protect individuals from state sponsored ideologies, and to
protect democracy itself from state establishments which might
destroy freedom of thought.59 The modified-Seeger definition of reli-
gion brings into judicial awareness the diversity of totalitarian and the-
ocratic dangers to freedom from state establishment of nontraditional
"ultimate" doctrines. In addition, the modified-Seeger definition of
religion would not lead to wholesale invalidation of laws under estab-
lishment law, because majority "enactments" are distinguishable from
majority indoctrinations of either "ultimate values" or "ultimate
meanings."
To unify the Constitutional definition of religion, the Court should
extend the expansive modified-Seeger definition to the establishment
clause.6° Making Seeger useful under the establishment clause requires
splitting "ultimate concern" into "ultimate values" and "ultimate
meanings." "Ultimate values" are life-guiding "oughts" or ends.
"Ultimate meanings" are the untestable "explanations" which begin
where science must stop. This conceptualization provides empirical
indicators of religion necessary to show establishment, while not nar-
rowing the sincerity approach of free exercise law.
As part of modifying Seeger, the standard should be made "plural"
and uniform under both religion clauses. For example, Kent Greena-
walt rejects the idea that humans have a single "ultimate concern,"
pointing out that humans have multiple "ultimate concerns."'" Con-
sonant with this observation, Seeger should be reformulated in terms
of multiple, "ultimate concerns." 62 Without acknowledging the multi-
59. E.g., L. GOODWYN, THE POPULIST MOMENT passim, 153 (1978) (effective democracy
requires that people be able to think outside of received, established modes of thought).
60. Greenawalt points out that the word "religion" appears only once in the first amendment,
logically implying that the definition should be the same under both clauses. Greenawalt. supra
note 30. at 758. Greenawalt's criticisms of the Harvard Note coincide with this Comment's, but
Greenawalt draws opposite prescriptions. See also Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I, 32
(1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
61. Greenawalt, supra note 30, at 808 (1984); see also Freeman. supra note 43.
62. Greenawalt criticizes the Seeger approach, not to improve it, but in hopes of displacing it
with his "analogical" approach. See supra notes 32-49 and accompanying text.
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plicity of "ultimate concerns," a definition of religion is unrealistic, as
well as more narrow than current Constitutional law.63
A. The Elements of a Reformulated Seeger
1. "Ultimate" Defined: The Unprovable, the Untestable, and the
Nonrational
Ethical and other value judgments do not have rational grounds.
"Means" are rational, but "ends" are not. Rationality can inform
one's choice between various means to an end, including the efficiency
and the likely consequences of one's chosen means. However, after
rationality clarifies the options, the choice of an end rests upon "non-
rational" grounds." For example, just because one uses reason to
"deduce" ethics from nonrational premises does not mean that those
initial premises have rational support.65
In contrast, Kent Greenawalt, believing that rational as well as non-
rational values exist, states that many "ethical judgments are support-
able on rational grounds."' 66 He gives the following example: "Human
beings must teach that killing innocent people is wrong if we are to
live in minimally peaceable and stable relations with each other. "67
Here Greenawalt has confiated two issues: The first is the empirical
means-ends issue of how to live in stable relations; the second is the
shared nonrational preference for "peaceable and stable relations."
Greenawalt's "rational" ethic is actually an empirical (rational) state-
ment conditioned by an "if" on a nonrational value. This nonrational
value, "stable relations," is an "ultimate" value as defined in this
Comment.
63. For example, Sherbert had refused to work on her Sabbath and was fired. The Court
stated that it was a "burden" on Sherbert to forgo "one of the precepts" of her religion. Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963). This is a plural standard which does not require that the
burdened precept be the sole precept of Sherbert's religion.
64. Choosing between means because of their "secondary" consequences, apart from reasons
of efficiency in achieving the "primary" end, also involves a nonrational balancing of competing
values. E.g., R. BRUBAKER, THE LIMITS OF RATIONALITY: AN ESSAY IN THE SOCIAL AND
MORAL THOUGHT OF MAX WEBER 72, 101 (1984) (no objective standards exist for judging ends
or choices between competing ends, although choices may be rationally framed).
65. See, eg., M. WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 281 (1946) (no matter
how systematic or how "rationalized" an ethical doctrine becomes, that doctrine still rests upon
a nonrational foundation of primary "values").
66. Greenawalt, Religiously Based Premises and Laws Restrictive of Liberty, 1986 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 245, 248 (1986).
67. Id.
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Greenawalt also argues that "nonrational" judgments exist and are
acceptable bases of political involvement. 68 Defining "nonrational"
judgments, Greenawalt writes: "[N]onrational judgments are those for
which one can assign no grounds other than a subjective reaction. 69
As Michael Perry points out, Greenawalt properly defines "nonratio-
nal," but then simply fails to follow the logic of his own arguments.7 °
Professor Perry correctly collapses the distinction between nonrational
and rational value judgments and collapses the distinction between
religious and nonreligious value judgments.7" At least Greenawalt
does concede that the philosophy behind this modified-Seeger
approach has a long and vital history.7"
For purposes of the modified-Seeger definition of religion, since only
subjective grounds exist for a judgment about value or meaning, that
judgment is "ultimate," beyond reason.73 "Ultimate" refers to all val-
ues and "knowledge" which cannot be proven true, or even tested, by
empirical evidence.74 "Ultimate" judgments rest upon some type of
nonrational "faith."
68. Greenawalt, The Limits of Rationality and the Place of Religious Conviction: Protecting
Animals and the Environment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1011 (1986).
69. Id. at 1050. This Comment assumes that "no grounds other than a subjective reaction"
exist in support of any values.
70. Perry, Comment on "The Limits of Rationality and the Place of Religious Conviction:
Protecting 4nimals and the Environment," 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1067 (1986).
71. Id at 1067-69.
72. Greenawalt admits that "there is a strong, though always controversial, tradition in
liberal philosophy that treats [all] ultimate value judgments as subjective." Greenawalt, supra
note 68, at 1055. As an example of "objective" value judgments, Greenawalt calls people who
wish to stick pins in other people "irrational." Id. However, sadists rationally pursue their
subjective preference when they stick pins in people. In turn, for those who share the nonrational
value against sadism, jailing the sadist is a rational means of defending that ultimate value.
73. See, e.g, A. JANIK & S. TOULMAN, WITTGENSTEIN'S VIENNA 192 (1973). Greenawalt
understands that nonrational judgments seem objective, not subjective, to the choosers, especially
if the subjective preference is widely shared ("intersubjective"). Greenawalt, supra note 68, at
1051.
74. Though beyond the scope of this Comment to present, the epistemology underlying the
modified-Seeger approach is "realist." Realist epistemology rejects the correspondence theory of
"foundationist" epistemology, and it rejects the radical subjectivism of "post-Kuhnian"
phenomenology. For the epistemological realist, human knowledge is a phenomenological
construction which is disciplined and shaped by the world. E.g.. Secord & Manicas, Implications
for Psychology of the New Philosophy of Science, 1983 AM. PSYCHOLOGY 399. Simply put,
although it has become a dogma in some circles to deny that humans can "know" anything, the
epistemological realist accepts the subjectivists' insights that human perceptions and
interpretations are imperfect, while also noting that radical subjectists do not cross streets
without looking for traffic. See also K. MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA 194, 256-59 (1936)
("situationally congruous thought," maligned by Mannheim, is adopted by this Comment as the
only morally responsible form of thought).
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Legal analysis should not unblinkingly adopt the value-laden lan-
guage of moral discourse. Moral rhetoric usually attempts to make
value judgments seem "objective" and "rational.". "Objectifying" val-
ues should be left to freely exercised religion. In part, people gather in
churches to find social reinforcement of particular ideals of values and
of personality. They then subjectively experience their values as
"objectively" true.75 Free exercise includes the voluntary submission
to doctrines which "objectify" nonrational values and present them as
"true." Free exercise also includes "objectifying" the untestable, ulti-
mate, "meaning" of prayer, of death, of natural processes, among
others. State action properly must pass the Thomas test before it
intrudes into this sphere. The state may only indoctrinate nonrational
ideas as objectively true or preferable within the limits prescribed by
the Valente test.
2. Criteria for Recognizing Ultimate Values
The most important distinctions for recognizing ultimate values are
the boundaries of science, at which the "Is" of science contrasts with
the life-guiding "Oughts" of ultimate values.76 In establishment cases,
courts must first ascertain permissible state action by using the scope
of scientific knowledge to draw the boundary of the "ultimate."77 All
the questions which science cannot objectively answer remain for
"ultimate" resolution.7" If, after this initial determination, the state
has gone beyond advancing science to advancing values, then analysis
75. See, eg., P. BERGER, THE SACRED CANOPY: ELEMENTS OF A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
OF RELIGION (1967). "Objectivication" is the process by which subjective creations, including
values, take on the characteristic of "facts" when humans forget that they created their social
world. Id. at 81-101. Unlike the objective existence of nature, the "objective" social world rests
upon the ever mutable subjective beliefs of the human participants. Changing one's mind
changes society.
76. This distinction between the "Is" and the "Ought" has been labeled "critical dualism" by
K. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES (1963). Popper argues that to promote
democracy, the "natural" world of what "Is" must be distinguished from the "social" world and
human "Oughts." Id. 61-66.
77. See, eg., M. WEBER, supra note 65, at 129-56, 281; R. BRUBAKER, supra note 64, at
49-60.
78. The resolution of "ultimate issues" is important to many people, and they seek
intellectuals who create doctrines which present resolutions of ultimate issues, usually in
"objective" terms, as palpable commandments, duties, "musts," and so on. The goal of the
establishment clause is not to prevent nonstate intellectuals from "objectifying" values and
meanings. The point is to free that process of "faith" from state purposes, effects, and
entanglements.
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must proceed in terms of majority enactments and Valente
standards.79
State interests also affect courts' "ultimate value" definitions, since
the state may have an interest in extinguishing certain values. In the
free exercise context, courts simply refuse to recognize or protect ulti-
mate values which are dramatically and diametrically contrary to
compelling state interests. 0
To conclude with an example, under the modified-Seeger definition
of religion, public schools never establish religion by teaching means-
ends, scientific, knowledge. If the public schools indoctrinate values
beyond those necessary under the Valente standard, then they are
impermissibly establishing religion. The ensuing burden upon the free
exercise rights of children and parents is unconstitutional.
3. Criteria for Recognizing Ultimate Meanings
"Ultimate meanings" are any statements, not about values or ends,
which are directly or indirectly untestable. Usually "ultimate mean-
ings" give nonscientific explanations regarding the "nature" of life, the
universe, and other real and imagined events.8 ' The criteria for recog-
nizing an ultimate meaning turn upon a distinction between "reflexive
79. In a free exercise case the "burden" on "religion" rests upon subjective sincerity
standards quite impervious to scientific critique; therefore, the Is-Ought distinction can only help
clarify state interests under the free exercise balancing test. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707
(1981). Consistency of ultimate values should not be a free exercise criterion. Most great moral
choices balance lesser evils. See, e.g., W. KAUFMANN, WITHOUT GUILT AND JUSTICE: FROM
DECIDOPHOBIA TO AUTONOMY 2-34 (1973). Sincerity could still be judged within some
evidentiary limits. See Dobkin v. District of Columbia, 194 A.2d 657 (D.C. 1963) (working on
one's Sabbath precludes one from refusing to appear in court on that Sabbath).
80. For example, the Court has supported state action withdrawing tax exemptions from a
racist religion. Although the Supreme Court did formally weigh racist religious beliefs in Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), the Internal Revenue Service was allowed to
deny the university tax exemptions because of its racism. In this type of case, since the
concededly sincere religion receives no protection, sincerity would not be at issue.
81. For example: humans suffer because of sin, or evolution is "God's tool," or history is a
"manifestation of Reason." In addition, acts, artifacts and organizations such as prayer, totems.
and churches also can have ultimate meaning. "Ultimate meanings" should not be found in
organizations apart from the beliefs of their participants. Similarly, Judge Hand took
organizational activity to be "evidence of the religion's belief about supernatural or transcendent
reality." Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939, 980 (S.D. Ala.), revd. 827 F.2d
684 (1 1th Cir. 1987). Taxation, and exemptions, can also create establishment clause claims
which raise the issue of religious organizations as existing apart from believers. Cf Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (tax exemptions are not establishment clause violations because of
long history of exemptions based upon social utility of charitable organizations). Walz does not
go so far as to give religious organizations an existence apart from the actions and meanings of
their adherents. But cf Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 107 S. Ct. 2862 (1987) (religious organizations may discriminate on religious
grounds in employment decisions).
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ontologies" of science and other metaphysics.82 Any metaphysical
statement which is not reflexive to empirical evidence is "religious"
under the modified-Seeger definition of religion. Empirical acts or
artifacts, with an untestable meaning are also "religious."83
Ultimate meanings are more likely to be established than burdefted,
because beliefs under free exercise law, distinguished from actions, are
presumed to be absolutely free from state intrusion.84 Practically, the
state cannot attain access to one's metaphysical assumptions and
beliefs.8" Once state action actually becomes indoctrination, advanc-
ing or inhibiting metaphysical beliefs, then an establishment of religion
is occurring.86
Teaching evolution incidentally contradicts some religions' ultimate
meanings, but teaching evolution is not an establishment.87 As the
Supreme Court has stated, evolution may be taught in the public
schools, and legislative action prohibiting the teaching of evolution
unconstitutionally establishes religion. 88  Nonetheless, if the schools
begin to indoctrinate untestable "ultimate meanings" imputed to
82. While scientific theories are abstract and rest upon ontological premises, what
distinguishes a scientific ontology from a metaphysic is that the scientific ontology is "reflexive"
to-i.e., changes in response to- empirical data. See W. SCHLUCHTER, THE RISE OF WESTERN
RATIONALISM: MAX WEBER'S DEVELOPMENTAL HIsTORY passim, 43-48 (1981) ("reflexive" is
used in a similar sense).
83. Very rarely should the state resort to the construction of ultimate meanings, instead of
indoctrinations of ultimate values, to create minimal order. There is less political danger in the
state teaching values and using majority coercion, because these latter two techniques of social
control do not distort citizen perceptions of empirical reality.
84. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 298 (1940).
85. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (being forced
to "confess" a "faith" through the flag salute invades the sphere of belief). In the language of
this Comment, Barnette states that the flag salute gives an "ultimate" meaning to the flag.
86. Although Seeger's "ultimate concern" test referred to a value against war, religions also
include doctrinal decrees regarding the "ultimate meaning" of empirical events. Barnette
provides support for this Comment's inclusion of metaphysics within the modified-Seeger
definition of religion. 319 U.S. at 624. In addition, the sociology of religion defines all "ultimate"
ideas as religious. See, e.g., P. BERGER, THE SACRED CANOPY (1967); M. WEBER, ECONOMY
AND SOCIETY 399-640 (1978).
87. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 450 (1961) (incidental effects on religion do not
violate the establishment clause); see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 683 (1984). Of
course, these incidental effects may "burden" free exercise.
88. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987). As part of a larger issue of creating
democratic culture, compelling state interests in citizenship require that citizens learn a candid
approach to the politically relevant empirical world. Some hard facts might incidentally
contradict that part of religious "objectification" of values, or more likely "ultimate meanings,"
which conflate the Is and the Ought. In spite of democracy's need for a scientific and antinomian
culture, nonstate intellectuals would still have free reign outside the school house, and beyond
the school years.
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evolution, they violate the establishment clause and impermissibly
burden free exercise rights.89
Misrepresenting empirical facts is as much a religious distortion of
empirical truth as was the medieval church's distortion in making
Galilleo recant his statements that the earth orbited the sun.90 Once a
theory no longer yields before the facts, it becomes an "ultimate mean-
ing," a "religion" under the first amendment. This use of deception
and distortion as a tool of social control, common to theocratic and
totalitarian states, should pass Valente scrutiny before our government
may use it.9 '
B. Balancing Interests Under the Establishment Clause: Majority
Action and Valente Scrutiny
An expansive establishment clause definition of religion requires
that the legitimate enactments of majorities be distinguished from
majority governmental actions which indoctrinate, advance or inhibit
any "ultimate value" or any "ultimate meaning". Once that distinc-
89. The empirical facts underpinning evolution merely inform humans of likely means-ends
consequences of their actions. To go further and pretend that evolution creates moral
imperatives turns evolution into a religion. For example, while Social Darwinism or millenarian
Marxism could be taught factually and historically as ideologies which have been causally
important in human affairs, those teleological ideologies should not be taught as if they are
objectively "true."
Whitehead and Conlan call Social Darwinism the "cultural application" of evolutionary
science. Whitehead & Conlan, The Establishment of the Religion of Secular Humanism and Its
First Amendment Implications, 10 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 39 (1978). Whitehead and Conlan
explicitly claim that the Is-Ought distinction is part of their analysis. Id. at 48 n.231. However,
they consistently fail to use critical dualism in their analysis of evolution. See also Gould,
William Jenning Bryan's Last Campaign, 96 NAT. HIsT. 16 (1987) (Bryan fought Darwinism
because of the pro-capitalist Social Darwinists); cf R. HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN
AMERICAN THOUGHT (1944). For a description of the theological underpinnings of Marx's
teleological theory of historical "progress," see J. ELSTER, MAKING SENSE OF MARX passin,
27-37 (1985).
90. As a recent example of right-wing attempts to use this tactic, the Meese Commission tried
to create an ultimate meaning it thought would reinforce "traditional" values by distorting
public perceptions regarding crime and pornography. This approach resembles medieval Church
and modern totalitarian tactics of deceit as a tool of social control. See Symposium on
Pornography, SoC'Y July/Aug. 1987, at 6-32; cf Fallows, The Japanese are Different from You
and Me, ATLANTIC Sept. 1986, at 35-36. For an example of the same tactic on the political
"left," see Beer, Resolute Ignorance: Social Science and Affirmative Action, SOC'Y May/June
1987, at 63.
91. For a succinct theory of how the powerful control social perceptions to manipulate the
populace, see P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 108-16
(1966). In past times, this tactic was called "theocratic." In modern times, the totalitarian party
state has been equally fierce in monopolizing the power to define ultimate values and meanings.
E.g., C. FRIEDRICH & Z. BREZINSKI, TOTALITARIAN DICTATORSHIP AND AUTOCRACY 9
(1962).
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tion is made, then only the latter activities will be struck down, unless
those actions pass the strict scrutiny of the Valente test.92
1. Majority Enactments Distinguished
In the United States' political system, political minorities obey
majority "enactments" which are passed within Constitutional con-
straints. Laws are merely the means to legislatively determined ends.
In other words, majority enactments contain values which are derived
from the choices of the majority, and from the ultimate, nonrational
values of the majority. But the ensuing state action simply expresses
constitutionally allowed power, and does not present those majority
values as morally superior to minority values. The electoral process
merely aggregates values into legislative instructions for state
administration.
Rarely, therefore, will the modified-Seeger definition of religion cre-
ate establishment clause problems for majority legislation. Instead,
majority actions will continue to be scrutinized under the free exercise
clause. For example, the compulsory majority extraction of taxes may
create free exercise burdens.93 Taxation does not create an establish-
ment issue unless it advances or inhibits ultimate ideas.
2. State Interests and Strict Scrutiny: Valente
State actions reach the Valente balancing test only if they fail the
Lemon test.94 By definition such state actions are, to some degree,
state establishments of "ultimate" values.95 For example, the Supreme
Court has allowed state indoctrination of the "fundamental values
necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system,"
including tolerance.96 Among other goals, this includes a compelling
interest in preparing citizens for economic and political life.97 The
92. Larsen v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 249 (1982).
93. In practice, however, as the Court recently made clear, compelling state interests in
taxation overpower most free exercise claims. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260-61 (1982)
(employed Amish may not opt out of paying Social Security taxes).
94. See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
95. John Mansfield would call this state religion "the philosophy of the Constitution."
Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Philosophy of the Constitution,
72 CALIF. L. REV. 847 (1984).
96 Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159, 3164 (1986) (quoting Ambach v.
Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979)).
97. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (Amish allowed to quit school after eighth
grade; key fact for plaintiffs in Yoder was that they were not going to participate in the general
society); see also Duro v. District Attorney, 712 F.2d 96, 97-99 (4th Cir. 1983) (Yoder
distinguished because Duro's children were going to join mainstream society and he had not
demonstrated that home instruction would prepare his children to be self-sufficient in modern
461
Washington Law Review Vol. 63:445, 1988
empirical questions in Valente cases will turn on whether such indoc-
trination is truly "necessary." 98
The courts' tests of "necessity" should include these questions:
First, do the state's chosen means really effect their purported end?99
The courts should demand empirical evidence from the state to pre-
vent subversion of the establishment clause by mere assertion. The
Valente standard of closely fitted means cannot be satisfied by less."o
Second, have Valente interests in the survival of a viable democracy
become confused with mere majority interests? At some point, not far
beyond a very minimal state establishment, "state necessity" merely
becomes an objectification of majority values, the practical equivalent
of a majoritarian theocracy.'' As always Valente places the burden of
proof on the state.
society or enable them to participate intelligently in the political system). Also, the state has a
compelling interest in public health and welfare. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944) (upholding religiously offensive child labor laws); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. I1
(1905) (upholding compulsory vaccinations).
98. Other than teaching the substantive values of constitutional politics and economic self-
sufficiency, democracy requires a dedication to certain forms of thought, but not to any
particular content of thought. For example, critical thought must be taught, so that citizens will
not merely be an unthinking mass, ripe for the demagogue. For a discussion of the importance to
American democracy of the culture of "mature distrust" held by the Founding Fathers, see R.
EDEN, POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND NIHILISM 1-15 (1983).
The mental process of critical thought, and the value of critical thought, can be taught without
indoctrinating any political content. The plaintiffs in "secular humanism" cases may be opposed
to critical thought precisely because it has been given, unjustifiably, a content of "progressive"
values objectified as "rational." Instead of attacking left-wing content, the right-wing now
attacks the forms of rational thought. Compare Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp.
939 (S.D. Ala.), rev'd, 827 F.2d 684 (11 th Cir. 1987) with Marcuse, Repressive Tolerance, in A
CRITIQUE OF PURE TOLERANCE 81 (1970) (advocating selective tolerance).
99. For example, what degree of indoctrination is "necessary" to imbue democratic values?
At some point deterrence by punishment for discrimination should be the state "means" to
prevent discrimination; in this case, antidiscrimination values are represented factually, not
"ultimately," in majority enactments. The use of state power to shape behavior contrasts sharply
with allowing the state to indulge in dangerously extensive indoctrination in attempts to shape
ultimate values and meanings regarding racial groups.
100. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 248-49 (1982). In comparison with the "least
restrictive means" test of free exercise law, the Valente test can be thought of as a "most
restrictive means" test.
101. That the state will "establish" some values to create a minimal democratic order does
not betray freedom. Writing in the midst of World War II, Karl Polanyi poignantly saw that
liberal democracies had failed to use state power to protect even a minimal social order, paving
the road for the fascists, who were all too ready to use power to end social disorder. Our task,
Polanyi writes, is to recognize that social life requires that power be used to organize "society,"
while still respecting freedom. K. POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 249-58B (1944).
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III. APPLYING THE MODIFIED-SEEGER DEFINITION OF
RELIGION TO MOZERT AND SMITH
In two recent cases, plaintiffs attacked "secular humanism" in the
public schools on first amendment grounds. In both, the plaintiffs won
at the trial court level, and were reversed on appeal. 102 These cases
provide useful illustrations of how the modified-Seeger definition of
religion better protects free exercise and democracy by examining non-
traditional ideas as possible establishments.
A. Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools: Free Exercise, State
Interests and "Opting Out" of Portions of the Public School
Curriculum
In Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools, the plaintiff parents,
who objected to new texts, arranged for their children to "opt out" of
the reading portion of the public school curriculum, while still retain-
ing the general state benefit of public education. Although the rele-
vant principals and teachers accepted this arrangement, the Hawkins
County School Board voted unanimously to end any alternative pro-
grams. The parents then filed the lawsuit. 103
At trial, Judge Hull applied Thomas rules to find that a sincere
belief"° had been burdened by conditioning a state benefit upon con-
duct proscribed by a religion.105 Further, Judge Hull found that the
state interest in requiring the use of standardized reading texts did not
outweigh the burden to the plaintiffs.10 6 He held that state interests
could be met by less restrictive means. Since state law included provi-
sions for home teaching, a partial "opting out" program would still
serve state interests. 10 7 The court enjoined the school district from
requiring the students to read the new reading texts, and the school
district was ordered to allow the students to attend public school, as
long as the "opt out" program met state home education standards. 10 8
Although Judge Hull had accurately applied Thomas rules, on
appeal all three judges voted to reverse. Howeier, only Judges Lively
102. Smith v. Board of Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939 (S.D. Ala.), rev'd, 827 F.2d 684 (1 1th Cir.
1987); Mozert v. Hawkins County Pub. Schools, 647 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. Tenn. 1986), rev'd sub
nom. Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 56
U.S.L.W. 3569 (1988); see supra notes 8, 9.
103. 647 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
104. Defendants had conceded sincerity. Id. at 1197. Free exercise rules were probably
applied because "opting out" is a free exercise remedy.
105. Id. at 1199-1200 (citing Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1981)).
106. Mozert, 647 F. Supp. at 1202.
107. Id. at 1201.
108. Id. at 1203.
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and Kennedy shared a rationale. 9 They agreed that the plaintiffs had
not been burdened by "mere exposure" to the offensive books., " This
viewpoint clearly rejects the subjective sincerity standard of Thomas.
Under Thomas rules no objective standard of "burden" exists. There-
fore, once sincerity is shown, plaintiffs reach the balancing test.
Judge Kennedy assumed that even if a burden existed, compelling
state interests in preparing students for citizenship outweighed the
plaintiffs' burden. "' Judge Kennedy defended the Hawkins School
Board's means as the least restrictive, given the threat of "divisiveness
and disruption" that requests for such exemptions might cause.' "
While this analysis is largely consistent with Thomas rules, it is weak-
ened by reliance upon bald assertions regarding the empirical results
of allowing the plaintiffs to "opt out." The modified-Seeger approach,
by contrast, would require the state to present testable, causal evidence
of the effects of "opt out" programs. Under this approach the state
would bear the burden of providing the evidence that negative results
will indeed occur.
Finally, Judge Boggs concurred in the judgment only." 3  He
believed that the Thomas test was properly applied, including the
sincerity test for "burden.""' 4 However, Judge Boggs believed that
school boards are only constrained by the establishment clause, and
not the free exercise clause." 5 This school board exemption to the
Thomas rules leaves such plaintiffs at the mercy of the majoritarian
results of school board elections." 6 While Judge Boggs would have
liked to help the plaintiffs, he felt that the Supreme Court, not an
appellate court, should extend Thomas protections to school children
and their parents.'
Thomas protections should be extended to those children and par-
ents. 8 The modified-Seeger approach takes the Mozert plaintiffs as far
109. Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987).
110. Id. at 1070.
11I. Id. at 1071 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
112. Id. at 1072. By contrast, in trial court, Judge Hull had considered the school district's
fear of a "barrage of such requests." However, he found such a barrage unlikely, and not
justicable on the facts before him. Mozert, 647 F. Supp. at 1202.
113. 827 F.2d at 1073.
114. Id. at 1074. Judges Lively and Kennedy, by rejecting concededly sincere assertions of
"burden," imported an objective test into the free exercise clause.
115. Id. at 1073.
116. Id. at 1081.
117. Id.
118. The idea of school board discretion was again stated in Edwards v. Aguillard: while the
parameters were not clearly stated, the Court reaffirmed the idea that school board discretion
must comport with " 'the transcendent imperatives of the First Amendment' ". 107 S. Ct. 2573,
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as the free exercise balancing test while applying Thomas rules to pub-
lic schools. The plaintiffs' sincere beliefs deserve this respect. Next, iv
applying the balancing test, the modified-Seeger approach demands
that the state provide empirical verification of its interests, and would
not settle for mere assertions of cause and effect. Under this approach,
Judge Hull's decision probably would be upheld.11 9
B. Smith v. Board of School Commissioners: Testing the
Establishment of "Secular Humanism"
In Smith v. Board of School Commissioners, the plaintiff parents,
teachers, and students attacked the entire Mobile County public
school curriculum under both religion clauses. The district court
determined that the "burden" on the plaintiffs was incidental to the
establishment of "secular humanism" in the public schools, and there-
fore decided the case under establishment clause law. l" ° The district
court granted the establishment clause remedy of voiding the offensive
state action entirely by banning the offensive books from the class-
room."'1 In his opinion, Judge Hand applied law that included a defi-
nition of religion resembling the modified-Seeger approach.122
Although Smith was unanimously reversed on appeal, Judge Hand
was reversed on his factual findings regarding the content and effects
of the textbooks, and not on his view of the law."13 The circuit court
applied Lemon's purpose prong and found that the texts were chosen
2577 (1987) (quoting Board of Educ. v. Pico, 475 U.S. 853, 864 (1982)). Judge Boggs appears to
have misread the Court.
119. Democracy has endured in Tennessee with the old Holt readers, and the threat from
using them is miniscule. If the new Holt readers actually presented resolutions of "ultimate"
issues as "true," and not merely factually as ways people have thought, then an establishment
clause issue would be present.
120. Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939, 975 (S.D. Ala. 1987).
121. Id. at 988.
122. Id. at 975-80. The modified-Seeger approach to "ultimate meanings" resembles Judge
Hand's law: "However, to claim that there is nothing real beyond observable data is to make an
assumption based not on science, but on faith, faith that observable data is all that is real." Id. at
982. The modified-Seeger definition categorizes such untestable statements as "ultimate
meanings." See supra notes 81-91 and accompanying text. Religion was also defined in terms of
"fundamental assumptions," including ultimate ends and the purpose and nature of man, life,
and the universe; this was distinguished from a "way of life" which ignores "ultimate issues."
655 F. Supp. at 979. In contrast, the modified-Seeger approach would find some ultimate ends in
all ways of life.
123. Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 827 F.2d at 690, 694, 695. The one criticism Judge
Johnson made of Judge Hand's law revealed a misunderstanding. Judge Johnson thought that
Judge Hand ordered that all religions be taught equally. Id. at 695. Actually, Judge Hand
required equal presentation of all religions only ifiany were taught; Judge Hand preferred that no
religions be taught as if objectively true in the public schools. 655 F. Supp. at 985-87.
Washington Law Review
for "the secular purpose of education."' t2 4 Since Judge Hand focused
upon actual effects of the school books, the purpose prong of Lemon
was marginally relevant to the appeal.' 25
On the second prong of Lemon, the appellate court measured effects
in terms of government "endorsement of religion" or "a message of
approval."'' 2 6 The court never vigorously looked at the empirical
effects of the curriculum. The modified-Seeger approach would not
stop short of judging the testable, measurable impact of the govern-
mental action in advancing or inhibiting "ultimate" values and
meanings. 127
The most difficult issue in Smith, not satisfactorily addressed by the
appellate court, pertains to the omissions of religious history in the
American history texts. 128 Judge Hand found these omissions to be
impermissible discrimination against religion.' 29 The appellate court
found the omissions to be incidental and immaterial.' 30 The Smith
plaintiffs have a colorable claim which a court should not dismiss
short of careful fact gathering.
At some point omissions rise to an empirical distortion creating in
students' minds an "ultimate meaning" which is impermissibly con-
trary to the facts of history. Under modified-Seeger, once omissions
rise to bad science, or to obvious distortions regarding causality, then
a real factual issue exists regarding the creation of an "ultimate mean-
ing.""'' Under Lemon, failure on one prong invalidates the state
action.' 3 2 Therefore, plaintiffs should obviate the need to attack edu-
124. 827 F.2d at 693.
125. 655 F. Supp. at 983. The modified-Seeger approach would sharpen the purpose issue by
asking: Are the books intended to resolve "ultimate" issues by presenting "objectified" answers
to those ultimate questions?
126. 827 F.2d at 692-93. While citing the majority opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 682 (1984), Judge Johnson actually seems to be using Justice O'Connor's test of the
"message" as the test for the Lemon effect prong. Compare Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O'Connor,
J., concurring) with Smith, 827 F.2d at 692-93 (message analyzed in terms of state purpose).
127. This doctrine still leaves room for Judge Hand to be reversed on his findings of fact.
128. Serious scholarly studies of textbook content reveal complete omission even of the
religious motivations which were causally crucial in American history. Vitz, Religion and
Traditional Values in Public School Textbooks, PuB. INTEREST, Summer 1986, at 79 (texts also
completely omit traditional family roles). Standards for coverage in history texts could include
the causal importance of the events described, as modified by Valente citizenship interests.
129. 655 F. Supp. at 985.
130. 827 F.2d at 693-95.
131. For an account, more complex than the scope of this Comment allows, of the
importance of factual omissions for controlling the religion (symbolic universe) of a culture, and
thereby people, see P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY
112-16 (1966).
132. 107 S. Ct. at 2577.
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cators' intentions by instead presenting the effects of such
omissions.1
33
Even if Judge Hand was right on all the above issues, the Valente
balancing test might still protect the textbooks. The appellate court
mentioned the state interest in indoctrinating the values of citizenship,
but it did so improperly as part of determining the "governmental
message." 134 Instead, the court should have balanced the disestablish-
ment values of the first amendment with the state need to indoctrinate
its "minimal establishment" of citizenship values.
In sum, the modified-Seeger approach would substantially clarify
the issues in the "secular humanism" cases, without radically depart-
ing from previous law. The resulting legal clarity would make factual
findings the most vital determinants of these cases.
IV. CONCLUSION
"We have not yet come close to reconciling Lemon and our Free
Exercise cases, and typically we do not really try," wrote Justice Scalia
in Edwards v. Aguillard'35 The time has come for the Court to finish,
under the establishment clause, what it began under the free exercise
clause. By recognizing the great diversity of human beliefs as "reli-
gious" under the free exercise clause, the Court exchanged a naive
ethnocentrism for a complex legal world of balancing lesser evils.
136
This action opened the gap between the religion clauses. In response,
the Court cannot, as some would have it, close that gap by returning
to nineteenth century Christian theocentrism.137 Instead, the Court
must undertake the weighty task of protecting the full range of first
133. Social "scientists" and teachers simply may not comprehend how many of their
"theories" are religious, not scientific. Plaintiffs should rely upon the effects prong of Lemon in
these cases. Cf, Hacker, The Decline of Higher Learning, N.Y. REy. BOOKS, Feb. 13, 1986, at
35, 38 reviewing M. FINKELSTEIN, THE ACADEMIC PROFESSION (1985) (social science
professors have the lowest I.Q.'s of any academic group). For example, some social "scientists"
still do not understand that functionalist social "theory" is a religion, not a scientific theory.
E.g., J. ELSTER, AN INTRODUCTION TO KARL MARX 190-92 (1986); J. ELSTER, MAKING
SENSE OF MARX (1985); D. MARTINDALE, SOCIOLOGY AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUES 1-27
(1975); J. TURNER & A. MARYANSKI, FUNCTIONALISM (1979).
134. 827 F.2d at 692.
135. 107 S. Ct. at 2595.
136. To invoke the indigenous metaphor of the Fortunate Fall: As the external paradise of an
innocent Eden was left behind, Adam and Eve, somberly weighed down with the knowledge of
good and evil, were promised an internal paradise of choices rightly made: "To leave this
paradise, but shall possess, a paradise within thee, happier far." J. MILTON, PARADISE LOST,
Book XlI, 11. 586-87 (Hughes ed. 1957). So, too, must the Court take up the burden of
knowledge.
137. Whitehead & Conlan, The Establishment of Secular Humanism and Its First
Amendment Implications, 10 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 1, 65 (1978).
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amendment values by broadening the scope of the establishment
clause.
The modified-Seeger definition of religion expands the establishment
clause by providing empirical indicators of religion. This objective
establishment clause half of the modified-Seeger definition comple-
ments, with its other half, the subjective sincerity standard of the free
exercise clause. All "ultimate values," from MOVE's pantheistic
imperatives to the Ten Commandments, are defined as religious, and
so are all "ultimate meanings," from chiliastic Marxism to creation-
ism. Without this untestability standard of "ultimate" culture, the
Court will fail to detect state establishments of new religions. The
"secular humanism" plaintiffs warn of such a theocratic threat. When
the Court finally addresses "secular humanism," it would be a danger-
ous pretense of innocence to restrict the establishment clause to tradi-
tional beliefs. Instead, the Court must protect democratic culture
from tyranny in all of its guises.
Craig A. Mason
468
Vol. 63:445, 1988
